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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court is currently considering a case 
that could dramatically change American health care—all because 
Congress eliminated a penalty tax on a party-line vote using a special 
procedure designed to facilitate budget matters.1  The case is California	
v.	Texas,2 called United	States	v.	Texas	in the lower courts.3  The penalty 
tax enforced the Affordable Care Act’s (“ACA”)4 individual mandate to 
purchase health insurance, and it was lowered to zero in the 2017 Tax 
Act under a streamlined Congressional procedure called budget 
reconciliation.5  The Federal District Court for the Northern District of 
 
*Professor of Law, Don L. and Mabel F. Dickason Professor, University of New Mexico 
School of Law; Smith College, B.A., 1991; Georgetown University Law Center, J.D., 1996.  
I am grateful to Professor Nathalie Martin for her insightful and helpful comments, to 
Professor Ernesto Longa and to Nicholas Corbitt for their invaluable research assistance, 
and to the University of New Mexico School of Law for its financial support of this 
project.  Opinions expressed in this Article are solely mine, as are any mistakes or 
omissions.1Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579 (N.D. Tex. 2018), aff’d	 in	part,	
vacated	in	part,	remanded, 945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019), cert.	granted	sub	nom. California	
v.	Texas, 140 S. Ct. 1262 (2020) (No. 19-840).  The case is an appeal from a Fifth Circuit 
decision, Texas	v.	United	States, 945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019), which in turn was an appeal 
from the Northern District of Texas, Texas	v.	United	States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579 (N.D. Tex. 
2018).  Although this case was denominated as United	States	v.	Texas in lower courts, 
and previous scholarship and commentary uses that name, the case is now denominated 
in the Supreme Court as California	v.	Texas.  For simplicity, this Article will use California	
v.	Texas consistently when discussing the case, even if a lower court’s decision is being 
discussed. 
 2 Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579 (N.D. Tex. 2018), aff’d	in	part,	vacated	
in	part,	remanded, 945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019), cert.	granted	sub	nom. California	v.	Texas, 
140 S. Ct. 1262 (2020) (No. 19-840).   
	 3	 Id. 
 4 What is commonly referred to as the Affordable Care Act is actually the 
compilation of two different bills: Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation 
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).  This Article uses the term “ACA” 
to refer to the compilation of both acts, available at 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ppacacon.pdf [hereinafter ACA]. 
 5 Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) [hereinafter 2017	 Tax	 Act].  This 
legislation was introduced as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, but the short title was removed 
because the reference to “jobs” in the title was deemed to be extraneous to the budget 
and thus violated budget reconciliation rules under which the legislation was being 
considered.  Therefore, the law is technically called the “Act to provide for reconciliation 
pursuant to titles II and V of the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 
2018,” but is still often colloquially known as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act or the TCJA.  See	
also Steve Akers, et al, The	2017	Tax	Act, 52 U. MIAMI PHILIP E. HECKERLING INST. ON EST. PLAN. 
Paragraph 100 (2018).  This Article uses the more neutral 2017 Tax Act to reflect the 
fact that the short title Tax Cuts and Jobs Act was actively removed as violating 
Congressional procedure. 
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Texas decided that the individual mandate could not be considered a 
constitutional exercise of Congressional power without the penalty tax, 
and further found that the individual mandate was not severable from 
any portion of the ACA.6  In other words, the District Court found that 
the now-unconstitutional individual mandate infected the entire ACA 
and made it unconstitutional.  On appeal, the Fifth Circuit agreed that 
the individual mandate is unconstitutional without a higher-than-zero 
penalty tax, but it remanded the case back to the District Court for 
additional analysis on the severability question.7  Before the District 
Court could provide this additional analysis, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to resolve the issue.8  Oral arguments were heard on 
November 10, 2020, and a decision is expected in the summer of 2021.9  
This leaves open the possibility that the entire ACA, or significant 
portions of it, will be struck down by the Supreme Court.10 
The ACA has fundamentally changed our health care system 
through reforms that improve health care coverage, delivery, and 
quality, and that lower cost.  Because Congress lowered a tax in a budget 
bill, you may be kicked off your parent’s health plan if you are 18 to 26 
years old.11  Your pre-existing conditions may be excluded from 
coverage altogether, or may cause your premiums to skyrocket.12  You 
may lose the Premium Tax Credit that helps you afford insurance, or you 
may lose access to lowered cost sharing that helps you afford your share 
 
 6 Texas v. United States, 340 F.Supp. 3d 579 (N.Dist. Tex. 2018), aff’d	 in	 part,	
rev’d	in	part	&	remanded, 945 F.3d 355 (5th Circ. 2019) [hereinafter Texas	D.Ct.]. 
 7 Texas v. United States, 945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019), cert.	granted	sub	nom.	Texas 
v. California, No. 19-1019, 206 L. Ed. 2d 253, 2020 WL 981805 (Mar. 2, 2020) 
[hereinafter Texas	5th	Cir.]. 
	 8	 Id. 
	 9	 California	 v.	 Texas, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/california-v-texas/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2020). 
 10 Pundits are speculating based on the tenor of questions during oral arguments 
that the Supreme Court will not strike down the entire ACA.  See, e.g., Katie Keith, 
Supreme	Court	Arguments:	Even	if	Mandate	Falls,	Rest	of	Affordable	Care	Act	Looks	Likely	
To	 Be	 Upheld, Health Affairs Blog (Nov. 11, 2020), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20201111.916623/full/.  
Nevertheless, this result remains a distinct possibility, in part because since the court’s 
National	 Federation	 of	 Independent	 Businesses	 v.	 Sebelius	 (“NFIB”) decision, Justices 
Bader Ginsburg and Kennedy no longer sit on the court. Justices Kavanaugh and Coney 
Barrett have joined the bench.  Justices	1789	 to	Present,	SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES, https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx (last visited Nov. 
23, 2020); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) [hereinafter 
NFIB]. 
 11 ACA § 1001, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–14. 
 12 ACA § 1201, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–3; ACA § 1201, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
300gg–1. 
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of medical costs.13  You may once again face the possibility of hitting a 
lifetime cap if you have the misfortune of becoming catastrophically ill.14  
You may lose your Medicaid coverage.15  You may lose the ability to 
compare the quality and safety records of nursing homes.16  Government 
programs that improve preventive care, that fund research regarding 
treatment efficacy, that tie provider reimbursement to patient 
outcomes, and that fund new approaches to lowering medical error may 
cease.17  These are only some examples of what is at stake if the ACA is 
entirely struck down as unconstitutional. 
From the moment that the ACA was signed into law, it has been 
under repeated attack, both in the courts and through the political 
process.  Various portions of the ACA have been challenged in court; 
some of those court challenges have been successful and others have 
not.18  The ACA, however, has remained largely intact despite court 
decisions striking down portions of the law.  Politicians have attempted 
to pass legislation to overturn or fundamentally alter the ACA; some 
important changes have been made legislatively, but outright repeal has 
failed.19  President Trump’s executive branch has sought to weaken the 
ACA administratively, and while those attempts have indeed weakened 
the impact of the ACA, the ACA remains largely in force.  The case 
currently before the United States Supreme Court threatens to finally 
kill the ACA in its entirety. 
This Article examines the decisions of the lower courts in California	
v.	Texas as well as relevant United States Supreme Court precedent with 
respect to the question of severability.  Proceeding on the assumption 
that the individual mandate is no longer constitutional, this Article 
analyzes how the severability analysis should be applied in this case.  
 
 13 ACA § 1401, codified at 26 U.S.C. § 36B; ACA § 1402, codified at § 42 U.S.C. 18071. 
 14 ACA § 1001, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–11. 
 15 ACA § 2001, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII). 
 16 ACA § 6103, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3. 
 17 See e.g., ACA Title IV, Subtitle B; ACA Title III, Subtitle F; ACA Title III, Subtitle A, 
Part 1; ACA § 10607. 
 18 See e.g. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012) (constitutionality of the individual 
mandate and Medicaid expansion); Sissel v. United States Department of Health & 
Human Services, 760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (constitutionality of individual 
responsibility payment); King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2485 (2015) (permissibility of 
extending premium tax credits to federal exchanges as well as state exchanges); Maine 
Community Health Options v. United States, 590 U.S. ___ (2020) (right of insurers to risk 
corridor payments). 
 19 Johnathan Cohn, The	ACA,	Repeal,	and	the	Politics	of	Backlash, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG, 
Mar. 6, 2020, 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200305.771008/full/.  See	 also	
Abbe R. Gluck, Mark Regan & Erica Turret, The	Affordable	Care	Act’s	Litigation	Decade, 
108 GEO. L.J. 1471 (2020). 
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This Article explores budget reconciliation and what the choice to use 
this procedure should tell us about Congressional intent.  This Article 
concludes that courts should have a very strong presumption in favor of 
severability when the offending legislation was passed in a manner that 
precluded the legislative body from directly repealing the statute.  In 
other words, a court should not do what the legislative body itself could 
not do. 
Part II of this Article provides background information on the ACA, 
what it does, and the challenges it has faced.  Part III provides 
background on the 2017 Tax Act and budget reconciliation and explains 
how the 2017 Tax Act impacted the ACA.  Part IV examines the 
severability question presented by the California	v.	Texas	litigation and 
provides analysis of how severability analysis should be applied in this 
case.  Part V concludes the Article. 
II. THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
A. Overview	
The ACA represents a stark departure from the public health policy 
of the American past.  Prior to the 1920s, Americans typically paid cash 
for treatment and health care was inexpensive because medical 
knowledge and technology was not very advanced.20  Some limited 
forms of health insurance started to develop in the 1920s as medical 
technology advanced and the demand for hospital care rose.21  
Employer-sponsored health care became popular during World War II 
as a way for employers to boost employees’ economic well-being 
without running afoul of the World War II-era wage control rules and in 
response to demands for health care benefits made by newly-powerful 
workers unions.22  Since then, health insurance for the adult, non-elderly 
population has continued to be primarily employment based, leaving 
the unemployed largely unprotected.23  The elderly generally receive 
health care through Medicare, a federal program, while the “deserving” 
 
 20 Alex Blumberg and Adam Davidson, Accidents	 of	 History	 Created	 U.S.	 Health	
System,	 NAT’L PUB.  RADIO (Oct. 22, 2009), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=114045132. 
	 21	 Id.	An early player in the health insurance market was Blue Cross. 
 22 Ezekiel J. Emanuel and Ron Wyden, Why	Tie	Health	Insurance	to	a	Job?, WALL ST. J. 
(Dec. 10, 2008), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122887085038593345; BARRY 
FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 302 (3d ed. 2015). 
 23 Paul Fronstin, Sources	of	Health	 Insurance	and	Characteristics	of	 the	Uninsured:	
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poor (children and those unable to work due to disability) generally 
receive health care through Medicaid, a federal-state partnership.24  
Even with these federal and federal-state programs, the majority of 
health care is provided through employers.25 
Before the ACA, unemployed people faced serious difficulty in 
finding and maintaining health coverage.  In addition, employees of 
smaller companies frequently do not have employer-provided health 
coverage, because their employers frequently are unable to offer 
coverage because of cost or administrative obstacles.26  Even the 
passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(“ERISA”), which fundamentally altered employment-sponsored benefit 
plans, left health care virtually untouched.  In fact, ERISA created a sort 
of “health care black hole” by preempting state efforts to regulate self-
funded plans while putting into place only limited federal rules.27  Only 
with the advent of the ACA has the federal government seriously 
attempted to methodically address health coverage for the adult non-
elderly population. 
With the passage of the ACA, American society had hoped that the 
era of health and financial insecurity due to lack of health insurance 
would begin to fade into history.  The ACA utilizes a uniquely American 
approach to expanding health care coverage.  Rather than opting for a 
more socialized path to expanded coverage, such as having government 
provide health care directly or having government be the sole or 
primary payer of health care expenses, the ACA continues the American 
tradition of placing private insurance companies at the heart of the 
health care financing system.28 
 
 24 Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing	Medicaid,	4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 432 (2011). 
	 25	 Health	 Coverage	 of	 the	 Total	 Population, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 
https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-
population/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,
%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D(last visited Jan. 12, 2020). 
 26 Fronstin, supra	note 23, at 11. 
 27 Hinda Ripps Chaikind, CRS	Report	for	Congress:	ERISA	Regulation	of	Health	Plans:	
Fact	Sheet, CRS Report for Congress: Received through the CRS Web (Mar. 6, 2003), 
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20030306_RS20315_06391c3dd8dee6d755db
573ba96efd09f32ed668.pdf.  Employer-sponsored health coverage funded through 
insurance, rather than being self-funded by the sponsor, is subject to the very limited 
ERISA rules and health insurance regulations imposed by the state.  Id. 
	 28	 Compare	The Commonwealth Fund, The	United	States	Health	Care	System,	2014, 
in	2014 INT’L PROFILES OF HEALTH CARE SYS. 153–162 (January 2015) (the primary U.S. 
health system where private sector providers are paid for services via private sector 
insurance companies), with	Ruth Thorlby & Sandeepa Arora, The	English	Health	Care	
System,	 	2014	 	in	 	2014  INT’L PROFILES OF HEALTH CARE SYS. 43–52 (The Commonwealth 
Fund January 2015) (the health system of England where the vast majority of providers 
are employed directly by the governmental National Health Service (a system similar to 
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The Supreme Court described the aim of the ACA as “to increase the 
number of Americans covered by health insurance and decrease the cost 
of health care.”29  It is clear that one of the primary goals of the ACA is to 
dramatically expand health care coverage, and that a corollary goal is to 
put coverage within reach of the average American by making coverage 
more affordable.  These are not the only goals of the ACA, however.30  
The ACA also seeks to improve the quality and efficiency of the health 
care system (by, for example, rating hospitals’ performance with respect 
to quality of care) and to eliminate or reduce “junk” health plans and 
ensure meaningful insurance coverage (by, for example, mandating a 
certain minimum level of benefits).31  In addition, the ACA operates 
somewhat as an omnibus health care act.  It includes numerous 
provisions that advance public health or improve health care quality 
and that are either unrelated or tangentially related to the more-talked-
about goals of insurance access and health care cost.  As examples of 
lesser-known, but still important, ACA provisions, the Fifth Circuit 
pointed to ACA requirements that certain chain restaurants disclose 
nutritional information and the ACA modification of health care fraud 
rules.32   
At the time that the ACA was passed, it was thought that there were 
three interlocking, core provisions affecting access to market-based 
individual insurance coverage.  The Supreme Court described these 
provisions as follows: “First, the Act bars insurers from taking a person’s 
health into account when deciding whether to sell health insurance or 
how much to charge.  Second, the Act generally requires each person to 
maintain insurance coverage or make a payment to the Internal 
Revenue Service.  And third, the Act gives tax credits to certain people 
 
the U.S. Veteran’s Health Administration)), and	 Isabelle Durand-Zaleski, The	 French	
Health	 Care	 System,	 2014	 in	 2014 INT’L PROFILES OF HEALTH CARE SYS. 53–62 (The 
Commonwealth Fund January 2015) (the health system of France where private sector 
providers are reimbursed directly by the government (a system similar to U.S. 
Medicare)).  While Medicare, Medicaid, and Tricare are important public health care 
payers in the United States, most Americans continue to be covered by employer-
sponsored health plans.  Health	Coverage	of	the	Total	Population, supra	note 25.  In 2018, 
private insurance, most frequently through group employer-based plans, covered 
approximately 55% of the population, government programs covered approximately 
35% of the population, and approximately 9% of the population was uninsured. Id. 
	 29	 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2580 (2012). 
 30 For an excellent overview of the different goals of the ACA and the specific 
provisions that promote those goals, see Wilton B. Hyman, An	Explanation	of	the	Patient	
Protection	and	Affordable	Care	Act,	38 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 579 (2012). 
 31 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(o) (Supp. 2015), 42 U.S.C. §§ 18022(a)(1), (b)(1) (Supp. 
2014). 
	 32	 Texas	5th	Cir, 945 F.3d at 401 (2019). 
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to make insurance more affordable.”33  These provisions are commonly 
referred to as Preexisting Condition Protection, the Individual Mandate, 
and Premium Tax Credits, and they were designed to make market-
based insurance more accessible to individuals.  Each of these 
provisions is discussed in more detail below. 
In addition to these three provisions that the Supreme Court 
labeled “core,” there are other very important provisions that affect 
efficient market-based health care coverage.  To make it easier for 
individuals and small businesses to shop for and purchase health 
coverage, the ACA required each state to set up an Amazon-style online 
exchange (also called a marketplace) with standardized features.34  If a 
state failed (or refused) to set up an exchange, the federal government 
was tasked with creating and operating an exchange on behalf of that 
state.35  Much like the Medigap supplemental insurance rules, the ACA 
sought to standardize individual policies to facilitate comparison 
shopping by creating a set of relatively standardized covered services 
and by establishing metal-rating levels indicating the required amount 
of cost-sharing under the policies.36  The ACA reduced cost sharing for 
lower income individuals enrolled in certain marketplace plans.37  The 
ACA established mechanisms to protect the insurance industry during 
ACA implementation (risk sharing corridors and reinsurance), and on 
an ongoing basis (risk adjustment).38  The ACA required that premiums 
be established using modified community rating, rather than using 
actual claims experience.39 
There are other provisions that are core to the overall goal of 
increased coverage without respect to the source of that coverage.  
While the ACA utilized a market-driven approach to increase health 
insurance coverage, that was not the only approach pursued.  As 
discussed more below, the ACA attempted to expand Medicaid to cover 
all lower-income individuals, even able-bodied adults, which is a major 
 
 33 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2485 (2015). 
 34 ACA § 1311(b), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b), (d); see	The	Affordable	Care	Act:	
A	Brief	Summary,	NCSL (Mar. 2011), https://www.ncsl.org/portals /1/ 
documents/health/HRACA.pdf. 
 35 ACA § 1311(b), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c). 
 36 ACA § 1302, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022(c), (d). 
	 37	 Id. 
 38 ACA § 1341–1343, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18061–18063; see	Cynthia Cox et al., 
Explaining	Health	Care	Reform:	Risk	Adjustment,	Reinsurance,	and	Risk	Corridors, THE 
HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Aug. 2016), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-
Explaining-Health-Care-Reform-Risk-Adjustment-Reinsurance-and-Risk-Corridors. 
 39 ACA § 2701, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg. 
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shift from traditional Medicaid eligibility criteria.40  The ACA mandated 
that larger employers offer health coverage of a certain quality or face a 
penalty.41  It also required that dependent children be allowed to remain 
on their parents’ insurance until age twenty-six.42  Further, the ACA 
prohibited lifetime caps on benefits.43  This is a non-exhaustive list. 
B. Select	ACA	Provisions:	Demonstrating	Continuing	
Effectiveness	of	the	ACA	Without	an	Individual	Mandate	
The courts in California	v.	Texas are grappling with the question of 
whether, now that the penalty tax has been lowered to zero, the 
individual mandate is still a constitutional exercise of Congressional 
power.  This Article proceeds on the assumption that it is not, even 
though the parties are actively arguing this issue.  Even without an 
individual mandate, however, many core provisions of the ACA would 
continue to remain effective and if left in place would continue to 
advance the goals of the Congress that passed the ACA and of the 
subsequent Congresses that have left most of the ACA in place. 
1. Protections for Individuals with Preexisting 
Conditions 
The provision of the ACA that is most closely tied to the individual 
mandate is the protection for individuals with pre-existing conditions.  
The ACA extends access to coverage for people with medical conditions 
that previously prevented them from obtaining coverage or that 
qualified them only for coverage with an insurmountably high price tag.  
Specifically, the ACA prohibits insurers from excluding coverage for pre-
existing conditions (i.e., covering conditions other than the one which 
the individual already has) or otherwise discriminating based on health 
status;44 it requires insurers to issue policies without respect to pre-
existing conditions (guaranteed availability);45 it requires insurers to 
renew policies without respect to preexisting conditions or claims 
experience;46 and it prohibits insurers from basing premiums on health 
 
 40 ACA § 2001, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII); see	The	Affordable	
Care	 Act:	 A	 Brief	 Summary,	 NCSL (Mar. 2011), 
https://www.ncsl.org/portals/1/documents/health/HRACA.pdf. 
 41 ACA § 1513, codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a), (c)(2); see	The	Affordable	Care	Act:	
A	 Brief	 Summary,	 NCSL (Mar. 2011), 
https://www.ncsl.org/portals/1/documents/health/HRACA.pdf. 
 42 ACA § 1001, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–14. 
 43 ACA § 1001, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–11. 
 44 ACA § 1201, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3. 
 45 ACA § 1201, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1. 
 46 ACA § 1201, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-2. 
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status, the receipt of health care, claims experience, or the existence of 
a preexisting condition.47  This is one of the more politically popular 
features of the law.48  Congress deemed the protections for persons with 
pre-existing conditions so important that it mandated the nearly 
immediate establishment (within 90 days of the passage of the ACA) of 
a high risk pool to quickly provide coverage for the affected 
individuals.49 
Such strong protections for individuals with pre-existing medical 
conditions risks creating adverse selection—a skewed market situation 
where people buy health insurance (or buy better coverage) only once 
they become ill which generally results in higher premium costs to cover 
the higher risks of the insured population.  To avoid creating adverse 
selection, the ACA’s individual mandate requires most people in the 
United States to have a minimum level of health care coverage.50 
As discussed below, the Supreme Court upheld the individual 
mandate in 2012 as a constitutional exercise of the federal 
government’s taxation authority by reading the individual mandate in 
conjunction with the penalty tax for not maintaining the required 
coverage (the penalty tax is called the shared responsibility payment).51  
Without the individual mandate, the pre-existing condition protections 
are at risk, and it must be admitted that the two provisions are very 
closely linked.  The individual mandate, however, is not the only or even 
the best method for preventing adverse selection.  Robust enrollment 
that includes healthy individuals is what prevents adverse selection and, 
as discussed below, the ACA incentives like the Premium Tax Credit 
have proven to be effective at boosting insurance enrollment.   
2. Medicaid Expansion 
The ACA expands access to health care coverage in several 
important ways, many of which have already been attacked in the 
courts.  Medicaid expansion is undoubtedly one of the more significant 
ways that Congress sought to expand access to coverage.  The ACA 
provides incentives for the states to expand eligibility for Medicaid 
coverage to include all adults under age sixty-five with incomes up to 
 
 47 ACA § 2701, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg. 
	 48	 Poll:	The	ACA’s	Pre‐Existing	Condition	Protections	Remain	Popular	with	the	Public,	
including	Republicans,	As	Legal	Challenge	Looms	This	Week, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND. (Sep. 5, 2018), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/press-release/poll-acas-pre- 
existing-condition-protections-remain-popular-with-public/. 
 49 ACA § 1101, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18001. 
 50 26 U.S.C. § 5000A. 
	 51	 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2571 (2012). 
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133% of poverty.52  Children in households with incomes up to 133% of 
poverty were already eligible for Medicaid prior to the passage of the 
ACA.53  The ACA made the Medicaid expansion mandatory for all states 
and provided 100% funding from the federal government for the first 
three years, gradually lowering the funding each year to 90% by 2020.54  
The sanction for not implementing the expansion was the loss of all 
federal funding for Medicaid—not just the funding for the expansion.55  
The Supreme Court, however,  found that the threat of withdrawing all 
Medicaid funding violates the United States Constitution and struck 
down that provision of the ACA.56  The Court explained that the federal 
government can use incentives under its Spending Clause authority to 
entice the states to enact programs, but only if the states voluntarily and 
knowingly accept the terms of the program.57  The ACA Medicaid 
expansion was deemed too dramatic a transformation of the program to 
qualify as a mere amendment of an existing program, and the threat of 
losing all funding was deemed to cross the line between encouragement 
and coercion.58  The Court went on to find that the provision 
withdrawing federal Medicaid funding was severable from the ACA as 
whole, meaning that a state that does not accept the Medicaid expansion 
may continue to operate under the prior Medicaid rules, effectively 
making the Medicaid expansion voluntary.59 
This decision, making the Medicaid expansion effectively voluntary 
for the States, creates strange side effects.  The Premium Tax Credit is 
only available to taxpayers with household incomes between 100% and 
400% of poverty, Medicaid expansion (if adopted by the state) is 
 
 52 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII). 
 53 Right before the ACA was passed, federal law required Medicaid programs to 
cover pregnant women and children aged 5 or under with household incomes at or 
below 133% of poverty, and to cover children aged six through eighteen with household 
income at or below 100% of poverty.  Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, & 
Kevin Outterson, Plunging	 into	Endless	Difficulties:	Medicaid	And	Coercion	 in	National	
Federation	of	Independent	Business	v.	Sebelius, 93 B.U.L. REV. 1, 19 (2013).  Despite this, 
all states had made the permissible election for more generous eligibility criteria for 
children, often using federal funding available through the Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (or CHIP).  Donna Cohan Ross & Caryn Marks, Challenges	of	Providing	Health	
Coverage	for	Children	and	Parents	in	a	Recession:	A	50	State	Update	on	Eligibility	Rules,	
Enrollment	and	Renewal	Procedures,	and	Cost‐Sharing	Practices	in	Medicaid	and	SCHIP	in	
2009, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. at 6 (Jan. 2009), https://www.kff.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/01/7855.pdf. 
 54 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(y)(1). 
 55 42 U.S.C. § 1396c, invalidated	by	NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
	 56	 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2608 (2012). 
	 57	 Id. at 2602. 
	 58	 Id.	at 2603–04. 
	 59	 Id. at 2607. 
PAREJA (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2021  5:57 PM 
80 SETON	HALL	LEGISLATIVE	JOURNAL [Vol. 45:1 
available up to 133% of poverty, and traditional Medicaid is often not 
available to able-bodied, childless adults unless their incomes are 
exceptionally low.60  Counterintuitively, a taxpayer with income at 
100% of federal poverty may receive federally subsidized health care 
coverage but a taxpayer with income below	100% of federal poverty 
may not.61  This would have made sense if Medicaid expansion were 
mandatory because the poorer person would have had access to 
Medicaid, but that is no longer guaranteed.62  Additionally, in a state that 
has not expanded Medicaid, poorer taxpayers with incomes under 
100% of poverty frequently are not eligible for Medicaid are also not 
eligible for federally subsidized coverage, yet they remain subject to the 
individual mandate unless they apply for and receive an exception.63  It 
is hard to imagine any rational Congress passing this combination of 
rules; nonetheless, the Supreme Court decided that the rest of the ACA, 
including its most significant provisions, could be severed from 
mandatory Medicaid expansion, despite the anomalies created.64 
The link between Medicaid expansion and expansion of access to 
health coverage became more complicated, but is still vital.  Many states 
expanded Medicaid right away.65  While some states have not yet 
expanded Medicaid,66 many adopted the expansion even after the 
Supreme Court decision that permitted them to decline.67  States that 
 
 60 Huberfeld, Leonard, & Outterson, supra	note 53, at 85-86. 
 61 Huberfeld, Leonard, & Outterson, supra	note 53, at 85-86. 
 62 Huberfeld, Leonard, & Outterson, supra	note 53, at 85-86. 
 63 Huberfeld, Leonard, & Outterson, supra	note 53, at 85-86. 
	 64	 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. (2012). 
 65 The earliest possible Medicaid expansion effective date was January 1, 2014, and 
the following states adopted Medicaid expansion at that time: Arizona, Arkansas, 
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia.  Status	of	State	






%7D#note-4 (last visited Jan. 12, 2020). 
 66 States that have not yet adopted Medicaid expansion are as follows: Alabama, 
Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Texas, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.  Id.  There is no deadline for a state to accept 
the Medicaid expansion, so some states may later change their positions. 
 67 States that have adopted Medicaid expansion, but with delayed effective dates are 
as follows: Michigan (Apr. 1, 2014), New Hampshire (Aug. 15, 2014), Pennsylvania (Jan. 
1, 2015), Indiana (Feb. 1, 2015), Alaska (Sept. 1, 2015), Montana (Jan. 1, 2016), Louisiana 
(Jul. 1, 2016), Virginia (Jan. 1, 2019), Maine (Jan. 1, 2019 with retroactive coverage), 
Idaho (Jan. 1, 2020), Utah (Jan. 1, 2020), Nebraska (Oct. 1, 2020), Missouri (Jul. 1, 2021), 
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have yet to adopt it continue to consider Medicaid expansion.  For 
example, the governor of Kansas announced in January 2020 that she 
and the legislature had reached a bipartisan deal that she anticipated 
would enable Medicaid expansion to pass the Kansas legislature in 
2020, a full ten years after President Obama signed the ACA into law and 
the Supreme Court struck down mandatory expansion, although that 
effort ultimately stalled in the 2020 Kansas legislative session.68  
Research has shown that Medicaid expansion positively correlates with 
a lower uninsured population; in other words, Medicaid expansion 
works to provide access to coverage.69  Despite the anomalies created 
by voluntary Medicaid expansion, Congress’ vital goal of expanding 
coverage advances even without mandatory expansion. 
Similarly, it is now clear that the individual mandate and the tax 
enforcing the individual mandate, while helpful, are not actually critical 
to Congress’ goal of expanding coverage.  Enrollment numbers have 
remained strong, despite numerous administrative challenges that have 
existed from the beginning.70  The IRS has always been limited in its 
 
and Oklahoma (not later than Jul. 1, 2021).  Status	of	State	Medicaid	Expansion	Decisions:	
Interactive	Map,	supra note 65.  Several of these states modified the Medicaid expansion 
rules through a Section 1115 waiver approved by the federal government.  Id.		Section 
1115 of the Social Security Act authorizes the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services (“HHS”) to “waive provisions of Section 1902 of the Medicaid Act 
for a limited period of time to allow states to engage in innovative ‘experimental, pilot, 
or demonstration’ projects that are ‘likely to assist in promoting the objectives of [the 
Medicaid Act].’”  Sidney D. Watson, Out	of	the	Black	Box	and	Into	the	Light:	Using	Section	
1115	Medicaid	Waivers	to	Implement	the	Affordable	Care	Act’s	Medicaid	Expansion, 15 
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 213, 214 (2015) (quoting Social Security Act § 1115(a), 
42 U.S.C. § 1315(a)(1)(2012)); see	also Mary Pareja, Humanizing	Work	Requirements	for	
Safety	Net	Programs, 39 PACE L. REV. 833, 852-53 (2019). 
 68 Mitch Smith and Abby Goodnough, Expanding	Medicaid	Was	 a	 Pipe	Dream	 in	
Kansas.	 Now	 It	 May	 Become	 Reality., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2020, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/09/us/kansas-medicaid-expansion.html; see	also 
Louise Norris, Kansas	and	the	ACA’s	Medicaid	expansion, HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG, (Dec. 7, 
2019), https://www.healthinsurance.org/kansas-medicaid/ (last visited Nov. 14, 
2020).  Medicaid expansion has been a bitter fight in Kansas, with the governor vetoing 
expansion in 2017 and expansion passing the house but dying in the Senate in 2019.  Id. 
 69 A Commonwealth Fund survey found that the non-elderly adult uninsured rate 
fell nationwide from 20% to 15% after the ACA’s first open enrollment period.  Among 
those living below the poverty line, the uninsured rate fell a dramatic 11% (from 28% 
to 17%) in states that expanded Medicaid versus a paltry 2% drop in states without a 
Medicaid expansion.  Sara R. Collins, Petra W. Rasmussen & Michelle M. Doty, Gaining	
Ground:	Americans’	Health	Insurance	Coverage	and	Access	to	Care	After	the	ACA’s	First	
Open	 Enrollment	 Period, The COMMONWEALTH FUND (July 10, 2014), 
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2014/jul/gaining-
ground-americans-health-insurance-coverage-and-access (last visited Nov. 14, 2020). 
	 70	 Marketplace	Enrollment,	2014‐2020:	Trend	Graph,	THE	HENRY	J.	KAISER	FAMILY	FOUND., 
(last visited Dec. 20, 2020), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-
indicator/marketplace-
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ability to enforce the penalty tax; the law allows the IRS to offset refunds 
to pay an outstanding penalty tax but prohibits the IRS from using other 
enforcement mechanisms, such as garnishments, liens, and levies.71  
From 2014 through 2016, the IRS accepted so-called “silent tax 
returns”—returns in which the taxpayer leaves the question about 
health insurance coverage unanswered.72  The Trump administration 
shortened open enrollment periods,73 slashed funding for education and 
outreach to boost enrollment,74 sought to advance alternative insurance 
such as short term policies and association health plans that are allowed 
to offer less than the federal minimum essential benefits and also escape 
state coverage mandates,75 and generally received criticism for 
attempting to “sabotage” the ACA because outright repeal has proven 
elusive.76  The 2017 Tax Act lowered the penalty tax to zero effective 
January 1, 2019.77  Despite all this, enrollment numbers have remained 
strong.78  It appears that the availability of subsidized coverage (the 
 
enrollment/?activeTab=graph&currentTimeframe=0&startTimeframe=6&sortModel=
%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D (showing that 
marketplace enrollment has been trending downward under the Trump administration 
(since 2016), but the downward trend is relatively flat and certainly not as marked as 
the initial enrollment surge was during the first two years of the marketplace). 
 71 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(g). 
 72 Louise Norris, Will	the	IRS	Still	Enforce	the	Individual	Mandate	Penalty	for	2018	
Tax	 Returns?, HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG, (Jan. 17, 2019), 
https://www.healthinsurance.org/faqs/does-the-presidents-executive-order-mean-
the-irs-wont- enforce-the-individual-mandate-penalty/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2020).  The 
IRS rejected “silent” returns for tax years 2017 and 2018, which counterintuitively 
represents an increase in enforcement right at the time that Congress voted to eliminate 
the penalty in the 2017 Tax Act.  The IRS had planned to start rejecting silent returns for 
2016 returns, but reversed course in response to an executive order signed by President 
Trump on his first day in office that directed agencies to use any discretion they had to 
waive or delay provisions or requirements of the ACA that “impose a fiscal burden on 
any State or  a  cost,  fee,  tax,  penalty,  or  regulatory  burden  on individuals, families, 
healthcare  providers,  health  insurers,  patients,  recipients  of healthcare services, 
purchasers of health insurance,  or  makers  of  medical  devices, products, or 
medications.”  Exec. Order No. 13765, 82 Fed. Reg. 8351, 8531 (Jan.  24, 2017). 
 73 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Market Stabilization, 82 Fed. Reg. 
18,346, 18,346 (Apr. 18, 2017) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147, 155-56). 
 74 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-565, HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES: HHS 
SHOULD ENHANCE ITS MANAGEMENT OF OPEN ENROLLMENT PERFORMANCE, (July 2018). 
 75 Exec. Order No. 13813, 82 Fed. Reg. 48385 (Oct. 17, 2017), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-10-17/pdf/2017-22677.pdf.  
	 76	 See	 generally	 Timothy S. Jost, The	 Affordable	 Care	 Act	 Under	 the	 Trump	
Administration, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (Aug. 30, 2018), 
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2018/affordable-care-act-under-trump-
administration.  
 77 2017 Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11081, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).  The effective 
date of the change is actually for “months beginning after December 31, 2018” because 
the penalty tax was imposed on a monthly basis. 
 78 See Marketplace	Enrollment,	2014‐2020:	Trend	Graph, supra	note 70.  
PAREJA (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2021  5:57 PM 
2021]	 CALIFORNIA	V.	TEXAS 83 
carrot) is much more effective at achieving enrollment than the threat 
of the penalty tax (the stick).  Just as the Supreme Court’s leaving the 
ACA in place despite the seemingly crucial mandatory Medicaid 
expansion facilitated the advancement of Congress’ goal of expanded 
access to coverage, so too the California	 v.	 Texas	 court has the 
opportunity to leave in place the ACA mechanisms that advance 
expanded access, even if it ultimately decides that the individual 
mandate itself is no longer constitutional. 
3. Employer Mandate 
Similar to the individual mandate coupled with the penalty tax, the 
ACA also mandates that larger employers provide health care coverage 
to their employees or face potential penalties (commonly called the 
“employer mandate”).79  This provision applies only to employers who 
had an average of fifty full-time employees in the prior year.80  An 
employer incurs the penalty only if one of the employer’s full-time 
employees enrolls in a plan through a Marketplace exchange and 
receives a Premium Tax Credit or is eligible for reduced cost sharing.81  
The employer mandate and employer penalty tax were not changed by 
the 2017 Tax Act, despite facing criticism since the ACA’s passage.82  This 
 
 79 26 U.S.C. §§ 4980H(a), (c)(2). 
	 80	 Id. 
	 81	 Id.		The issue of whether Premium Tax Credits are available in states that have not 
established their own exchanges was resolved in the affirmative by the United States 
Supreme Court in King	v.	Burwell.  King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 498 (2015).  The statute 
requires that the individual be enrolled “through an Exchange established by the State 
. . .”  26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(A)(i).  The IRS interpreted this to include exchanges 
established by the federal government on behalf of states that declined to establish their 
own exchanges.  26 C.F.R. § 1.36B-1(k); Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 30377–78 (May 23, 2012) (the preamble explains the IRS’s reasoning for adopting 
this rule).  This interpretation generated intense controversy, but ultimately the Fourth 
Circuit unanimously upheld the IRS’s interpretation as a permissible exercise of the 
IRS’s discretion to interpret ambiguous statutes, and the Supreme Court reached the 
IRS’s same conclusion through its own independent analysis.  King, 576 U.S. at 493.  The 
litigation was exceptionally important to the employer mandate because if a person 
living in a state that has not established its own exchange is not eligible for a Premium 
Tax Credit or reduced cost sharing because their only option is a federally-facilitated 
exchange, then that person’s employer also may escape the penalty for not offering 
health coverage to that employee, effectively gutting the employer mandate.  26 U.S.C. § 
4980H(a), (c)(2). 
	 82	 The	Current	Status	of	the	ACA	Employer	Mandate:	2020,	Integrity Data, updated 
Sept. 15, 2019, https://www.integrity-data.com/blog/current-status-of-aca-employer-
mandate-2019/.  The effective date of the employer mandate, originally scheduled for 
2014, was delayed because of concerns about the provision.  Internal Revenue Service, 
Questions	and	Answers	on	Employer	Shared	Responsibility	Provisions	Under	the	Affordable	
Care	Act, Question 2, https://www.irs.gov/affordable-care-act/employers/questions-
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also sheds light on Congress’ intent in lowering the individual mandate 
penalty to zero, as related to the severability question.  Congress could 
have similarly lowered the employer mandate to zero, even using the 
budget reconciliation process.  The 2017 Tax Act Congress, however, 
chose not to do so, instead leaving in place a politically unpopular 
mandate and penalty tax.  For a judge to do what Congress chose not to 
do, under the guise of the constitutional severability doctrine, is simply 
legislating from the bench. 
4. Affordability Rules 
The ACA takes several steps to help people afford what, for many, 
is the significant new expense of health care coverage.  First, those who 
are newly eligible for Medicaid as a result of the expansion will receive 
quality coverage with low to no cost sharing or premiums.83  Second, the 
ACA implements limits on cost sharing (deductibles, coinsurance, and 
copayments) that a lower-income or middle-income individual will 
face.84  Third, the federal government created a new refundable income 
tax credit called the “Premium Tax Credit” to help offset the cost of 
health coverage for lower-income and middle-income taxpayers.85  The 
Premium Tax Credit is a significant part of the overall ACA strategy.  
Indeed, 85% of people who enrolled in an exchange plan during the first 
open enrollment period for coverage in 2014 qualified for advance 
payments of the Premium Tax Credit.86  Without the Premium Tax 
Credit, premium costs likely would keep coverage out of reach for many 
Americans. 
The Premium Tax Credit is a subsidy designed to help low-income 
to middle-income taxpayers afford to buy health insurance on an 
exchange.  Generally speaking, a person is eligible for a Premium Tax 
Credit if he or she has a household income between 100% and 400% of 
 
and-answers-on- employer-shared-responsibility-provisions-under-the-affordable-
care-act#Limited (last visited Nov. 14, 2020). 
	 83	 See	supra	Part II.B.2. 
 84 42 U.S.C. § 18071 (2010); HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 
2016, 80 Fed. Reg. 10750, 10826 (Feb. 27, 2015) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 145, 
147, 153, 154, 155, 156, and 158).  Cost sharing reductions can apply for individuals 
with household income between 100% and 250% of poverty, on a sliding scale basis.  To 
receive the cost sharing reductions, the taxpayer is required to enroll in a silver plan.  Id.		
Special, more generous, rules apply to Native Americans.  Id. at 10799.	 	See infra	note 
100 and accompanying text regarding the classification of health insurance policies by 
precious metals. 
 85 ACA §1401, codified at 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2006). 
 86 OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETPLACE: SUMMARY ENROLLMENT REPORT FOR THE 
INITIAL ANNUAL OPEN ENROLLMENT PERIOD 9 (May 1, 2014), 
https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/76876/ib_2014Apr_enrollment.pdf. 
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poverty, purchases health insurance on an ACA exchange, and is not 
otherwise eligible for or actually covered by a qualifying employer or 
public health plan.87  Similar to the Earned Income Tax Credit (“EITC”), 
the Premium Tax Credit is a refundable tax credit.88  This credit will 
reduce the taxpayer’s tax liability (as shown on the return) to as low as 
zero, and if there is credit left over, the taxpayer will receive that left 
over credit amount as a refund.89  Taxpayers may claim the Premium 
Tax Credit retroactively on a tax return; the credit for any month in 2014 
would be claimed on a 2014 tax return, normally filed before April 15, 
2015.90  The Premium Tax Credit also may be paid on an advanced 
basis.91  If the advance credit is elected, the estimated amount of the 
credit is calculated by the health insurance exchange through which the 
person obtained the coverage and payments are made directly to the 
insurance company covering the individual.92  Advance credit payments 
are reconciled on the tax return for the year of the payments, meaning 
advance payments made during 2014 were reconciled on the tax return 
for 2014, which would normally have been filed before April 15, 2015.93  
If the actual amount of the credit on the tax return is less than the 
advance payments made during the year, the taxpayer must pay back 
the difference, subject to certain repayment caps.94  If the actual amount 
 
 87 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2006).  For a more detailed explanation of the eligibility rules for 
the Premium Tax Credit, see Mary Pareja, Beyond	the	Affordable	Care	Act’s	Premium	Tax	
Credit:	Ensuring	Access	 to	 Safety	Net	Programs, 38 HAMLINE L. REV. 241 (2015).  The 
federal poverty figures used for the Premium Tax Credit are published by the 
Department of Health and Human Services in the Federal Register at the start of every 
year.  26 U.S.C. § 36B(d)(3) (2006).  The figures that apply for a year are the most-
recently published figures as of the beginning of the open enrollment period for that 
year.  Id.		The open enrollment period for 2020 began November 1, 2019.  Key	2020	Open	
Enrollment	 Dates, HealthCare.gov Blog (Aug. 22, 2019), 
https://www.healthcare.gov/blog/2020-open-enrollment-key-dates/.  Thus, the 
poverty figures that apply for 2020 are the figures published at the start of 2018.  For 
2018, the poverty line for a single individual not living in Alaska or Hawaii is $12,140; 
each additional family member adds $4320 to the poverty line.  Annual Update of HHS 
Poverty Guidelines, 83 Fed. Reg. 2642, 2643 (Jan. 18, 2018).  Thus, for 2018, between 
100% and 400% of poverty for a single person means between $12,140 and $48,560.  
The poverty line is higher in Alaska and Hawaii.  Id. 
 88 26 U.S.C. §§ 36B(b)(2). 
 89 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Questions	 and	 Answers	 on	 the	 Premium	 Tax	 Credit,	
Question 1, https://www.irs.gov/affordable-care-act/individuals-and-
families/questions-and-answers-on-the-premium-tax-credit (last visited Nov. 14, 
2020). 
 90 26 U.S.C. § 36B(a). 
 91 42 U.S.C. § 18082 (2010). 
	 92	 Id. 
 93 26 U.S.C. § 36B(f). 
	 94	 Id.	 	 See	 also	 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 89.  While advance credit 
payments may make health insurance accessible by solving a cash flow problem, 
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of the credit on the tax return is greater than the advance payments 
made during the year, the taxpayer will receive the excess amount as a 
refundable credit.95   
The tax code calculates the Premium Tax Credit based on the 
taxpayer’s family size,96 household income,97 and the cost for a 
 
advance credit payments also create the risk that the taxpayer will have a nasty surprise 
come tax time.  This risk can be mitigated by opting to receive only a portion of the 
expected credit amount on an advanced basis.  The taxpayer can also mitigate this risk 
by diligently reporting to the exchange every month changes to the taxpayer’s 
household income or family size, which will adjust the advance credit payments made 
to the insurance company.  In the author’s experience working with low-income 
taxpayers through a low-income tax clinic, this sort of diligence is likely to be the 
exception, rather than the rule.  Persons living in poverty typically have more urgent 
matters that occupy their attention and time, such as finding their next meal (especially 
at the end of the month when the food stamps have long been exhausted), picking 
between paying the gas or electricity bill, and coordinating the family’s transportation 
to and from school and work often with no car and limited public transportation. 
 95 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra	note 89.  
 96 “Family” consists of all the individuals “for whom a taxpayer is allowed” to claim 
a “personal exemption amount” under Code § 151 for the taxable year.  26 U.S.C. § 
36B(d)(1) (2017).  Code § 151 generally allows a taxpayer to deduct from his or her 
income a “personal exemption amount” for themselves, their spouse if filing jointly, and 
for eligible dependents claimed on the return.  26 U.S.C. §§ 151(a)–(c) (2017).  Thus, 
“family” for ACA purposes refers to the tax unit and not the common understanding of 
family.  See	generally	Tessa R. Davis, Taxing	Modern	Families:	Mapping	the	Families	of	
Tax, 22 VA. J. SOC.POL’Y & L. 179 (2015) (discussing the Code’s broad conceptions of family 
and how the Code’s conceptions of family compare to family law’s conceptions of 
family).  The following broad categories of people potentially qualify as dependents 
when the corresponding requirements are met: (1) qualifying children: the taxpayer’s 
descendants, siblings, and sibling’s descendants (nieces and nephews, grand-nieces and 
grand-nephews, etc.) provided the dependent is unmarried, lives with the taxpayer for 
a majority of the year, is under age 19,  is a full-time student and under age 24, or any 
age but permanently disabled, and does not provide a majority of the individual’s 
financial support; and (2) qualifying relatives: almost anyone that lives with the 
taxpayer as part of the household for the entire year as well as the taxpayer’s 
descendants, siblings, nieces and nephews (but not grand-nieces and grand-nephews), 
direct ancestors, and aunts and uncles (but not their descendants), provided the 
dependent makes less than the personal exemption amount for the year and the 
taxpayer provides for more than half of the dependent’s financial support.  26 U.S.C. §§ 
152(c)–(d) (2017).  This is merely a broad summary of the rules; there are many 
wrinkles and exceptions that are beyond the scope of this Article. Thus, for ACA 
purposes, a “family” includes the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s spouse, and the taxpayer’s 
dependents as described above.  In addition, there are exceptions and special rules for 
non-citizens. 26 U.S.C. §152(b)(3) (2017).  
 97 “Household income” is based on “modified adjusted gross income,” which begins 
with the taxpayer’s “adjusted gross income.”  26 U.S.C. § 36B(d)(2)(2017).  Adjusted 
gross income is the taxpayer’s gross income as reported on his or her return less certain 
“above-the-line” deductions, such as the deduction for certain tuition payments and 
certain deductions for self-employed individuals.  26 U.S.C. §§ 62(a)(6), (18) (2020).  
The IRS modifies adjusted gross income by adding back any amounts excluded under 
the foreign income exclusion of Code § 911, any tax-exempt interest, and any portion of 
Social Security benefits excluded under Code § 86. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(d)(2)(B) (2017).  
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benchmark plan (or the cost for the actual plan selected, if lower).98  The 
benchmark plan is the second-lowest priced “silver” plan that can cover 
the taxpayer’s entire household.99  The ACA exchanges categorize plans 
by “metal colors”; plans are classified in ascending order from least 
generous to most generous, i.e.,  bronze, silver, gold, and platinum.100  In 
comparison, a silver plan benefit structure (the amount of copayments, 
coinsurance, and deductibles) is more generous than a bronze plan but 
less generous than a gold or platinum plan.101  The cost for the 
benchmark plan is the cost to the taxpayer if he or she were to actually 
 
There are clear inequities in using this definition to measure an individual’s ability to 
afford health care.  For example, inherited or gifted wealth is completely excluded from 
this definition of income.  See 26 U.S.C. § 36B(d)(2)(B) (2017).  This exclusion means a 
person could qualify for the Premium Tax Credit even if the person receives thousands, 
or even millions of dollars, from a family trust.  “Household income” is the modified gross 
income of each member of the “family,” or tax unit, with an important exception.  26 
U.S.C. §§ 5000A(c)(4)(B)–(C) (2019).  The IRS ignores income of a family member (i.e., a 
spouse or dependent) if the family member is not “required to file a return of tax 
imposed by [Code] section 1 for the taxable year.”  26 U.S.C. § 36B(d)(2)(A)(ii)(II) 
(2017).  Code § 1 is the section that imposes the income tax; it does not contain any rules 
regarding the requirement to file a return.  See	26 U.S.C § 1 (2019).  Code § 6012 contains 
the rules regarding when there is a requirement to file a return to report taxes imposed 
under Code § 1.  See	26 U.S.C. § 6012 (2018).  Code § 6012 exempts an individual from 
the obligation to file a return to report the tax applicable under Code § 1 if the 
individual’s income is not more than the personal exemption amount (currently $0) plus 
the applicable standard deduction amount (for most single taxpayers in 2020 this is 
$12,400 and for most married couples this is $24,800).  26 U.S.C. §§ 6012(a)(1)(A)–(B) 
(2018); see	 also Publication	 501	 (2019),	Dependents,	 Standard	Deduction,	 and	 Filing	
Information, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., at 2, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p501.pdf 
(last updated Jan. 13, 2020).  In other words, for ACA purposes, a family member’s 
income (including a spouse) would not count toward household income if it is under the 
applicable threshold that triggers the obligation to file a return.  26 U.S.C. § 
6012(a)(1)(A) (2018).  An individual may be required to file a tax return for other 
reasons, even though he or she is exempt from filing a return under the Code § 6012 
rules.  For example, if a person has over $400 of income from self-employment, he or 
she must file a return to report employment taxes.  26 U.S.C. § 6017 (2018).  In addition, 
there are many situations where a person will want to file a return even if they are not 
required to, e.g., to receive an over withholding refund or a refundable tax credit like the 
Earned Income Tax Credit.  Rocky Mengle, Kiplinger.com, 7	Reasons	to	File	a	Tax	Return	
Even	 If	 You	 Don’t	 Have	 To	 (Hint:	 They’re	 Due	 July	 15!), (Jul. 14, 2020), 
https://www.kiplinger.com/taxes/tax-filing/601011/reasons-to-file-a-tax-return-
even-if-you-dont-have-to. In such cases, that person’s income should not be counted 
toward household income for ACA purposes. 
 98 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2) (2017). 
 99 This could be a combination of plans if a single plan cannot cover the entire family, 
for example because a child is away at college or because of the relationships between 
the family members. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.36B-3(f)(1)–(2), (4) (2017). 
	 100	 See	 generally	 Health	 Reform	 and	 Your	 Insurance	 Options, WEBMD, 
https://www.webmd.com/health-insurance/reform-options#1 (last visited Nov. 21, 
2020). 
	 101	 Id. 
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enroll in the benchmark plan.102  Thus, the cost of the benchmark plan 
will vary depending on the taxpayer’s location, family size, and the ages 
of the enrollees.103  The Premium Tax Credit amount is the difference 
between the premium amount for the benchmark plan and the expected 
taxpayer contribution toward the premium.104  The taxpayer’s 
contribution varies depending on the taxpayer’s household income and 
ranges from 2% of income to 9.5% of income.105  It is important to note 
that, although the Premium Tax Credit is based on the benchmark plan’s 
cost, the taxpayer is free to enroll in a lower- or higher-cost plan.106 
There are several eligibility criteria for claiming a Premium Tax 
Credit: (1) the taxpayer107 must have “household income” between 
100% and 400% of the poverty line;108 (2) the taxpayer cannot be 
eligible to be claimed as the dependent of any other person;109 (3) the 
taxpayer must file a joint return if considered married within the 
 
 102 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(3)(C) (2017). 
 103 The ACA permits insurers to charge higher premiums to older insureds; an older 
insured may be charged up to three times more than a younger insured.  42 U.S.C. § 
300gg(a)(1) (2010).  Any age-based adjustment in premiums will be taken into account 
under the benchmark plan for Premium Tax Credit calculations. 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B-3(e) 
(2017).  The benchmark plan, however, will not take into account a premium adjustment 
for tobacco use; the ACA allows insurers to charge tobacco users up to 1.5 times the 
premium it would charge a non-user.  42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(1); 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B-3(e). 
 104 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b) (2017). 
 105 26 U.S.C. §§ 36B(b)(2), (3)(A) (2017).  The calculation of the taxpayer’s required 
contribution is fairly complicated, although online calculators can help taxpayers (and 
their advisors) estimate the likely contribution amount.  See,	 e.g.,	 Health	 Insurance	
Marketplace	 Calculator, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Nov. 21, 2020), 
https://www.kff.org/interactive/subsidy-calculator/.  
 106 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(3)(B) (2017); see also Health Reform: Beyond the Basics,	
Premium	 Tax	 Credits:	 Answers	 to	 Frequently	 Asked	 Questions, CTR. BUDGET & POL’Y 
PRIORITIES 2, 2 (July 2013), http://www.cbpp.org/files/QA-on-Premium-Credits.pdf. 
 107 The term “taxpayer” is used because the claimant must file a federal tax return to 
receive a Premium Tax Credit and it is the term used in the statute.  However, the term 
includes individuals who may not pay any federal income taxes, either because their 
income is too low to trigger the income tax or because their income tax liability is fully 
reduced by available credits, such as the EITC or the Child Tax Credit. 
 108 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(1)(A) (2017).  As discussed supra	in note 87, eligibility for the 
Premium Tax Credit for 2020 is calculated using 2018 poverty figures, and under those 
poverty figures, between 100% and 400% of poverty for a single person means between 
$12,140 and $48,560 with higher amounts in Alaska and Hawaii.  Annual Update of HHS 
Poverty Guidelines, 83 Fed. Reg. 2,642 (Jan. 18, 2018). 
 109 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(1)(D) (2017).  Notice that this is different than actually being 
claimed as a dependent of another taxpayer, despite the language in the FAQs posted on 
the IRS’s website.  The IRS’s website states that the claimant “cannot be claimed as a 
dependent by another person.”  INTERNAL SERVICE REVENUE, supra	note 89.  This is contrary 
to the plain language of the statute and likely represents an oversight rather than a 
conscious interpretation choice. 
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meaning of Code § 7703;110 (4) the taxpayer must not be eligible for 
government-sponsored coverage such as Medicare, Medicaid, CHIP, or 
TRICARE;111 (5) the taxpayer must not be eligible for an employer-
sponsored plan that is affordable and provides minimum value;112 (6) 
neither the taxpayer nor any member of the taxpayer’s family113 can be 
actually enrolled in an employer-sponsored plan, whether or not the 
plan is considered affordable or to provide minimum value;114 and 
(7) the taxpayer, taxpayer’s spouse, or taxpayer’s dependent must have 
purchased coverage through an exchange and paid the premium for the 
coverage.115  There are special rules that apply to non-citizens that are 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
All of these affordability rules would work perfectly well in the 
absence of an individual mandate.  Indeed, they have been effectively 
increasing enrollment from the beginning, even though the individual 
mandate has always been weak.  The affordability rules even continued 
to effectively boost enrollment after the individual mandate was gutted 
by the 2017 Tax Act’s repeal of the penalty tax.  It appears that 
Americans respond better or equally as well to carrots than to sticks. 
III. THE 2017 TAX ACT AND BUDGET RECONCILIATION 
A. Background	of	the	2017	Tax	Act	
The 2017 Tax Act was passed on December 20, 2017, on a nearly 
complete party-line vote, with Republicans voting in favor of the act and 
Democrats voting against it.116  Touted as pro-growth tax legislation, one 
 
 110 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(1)(C) (2017). 
 111 26 U.S.C. §§ (c)(c)(2)(B), 5000A(f)(1)(A) (2017).  This applies on a month-by-
month basis and is based on eligibility for the plan, not enrollment in the plan.  Thus, if 
a person meets all the eligibility requirements for a Premium Tax Credit in January, but 
becomes eligible for Medicaid starting in February, the person will receive a Premium 
Tax Credit only for January, even if the person does not actually enroll in Medicaid.  26 
U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(B)(i) (2017).  
 112 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(C) (2017).  A plan is considered “affordable” if the 
employee’s share of the premium for self-only coverage is 9.5% or less of the employee’s 
“household income.”  26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(C)(i) (2017).  A plan is considered to provide 
minimum value if it covers at least 60% of the total allowed costs of benefits under the 
plan.  26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(C)(ii) (2017).  
 113 See supra	note 96 for an explanation of the term “family” as used Code Section 
36B. 
 114 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(C)(iii) (2017). 
 115 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(A) (2017). 
 116 In the Senate, with only Senator McCain not voting due an illness, all Republicans 
voted in favor of the bill while all Democrats and both Independents voted no.  Roll	Call	
Vote	 115th	 Congress	 –	 1st	 Session,	 UNITED STATES SENATE (Dec. 20, 2017), 
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress
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of the primary features of the 2017 Tax Act was a permanent reduction 
in the corporate tax rate to a flat 21%.117  The 2017 Tax Act, however, 
made many other changes to the U.S. tax system, both large and small.  
For example, it doubled the estate tax exemption amount which, with 
annual inflation adjustments, allows a taxpayer dying in 2020 to pass 
$11.58 million estate-tax-free;118 for American businesses doing 
business internationally, it adopted a territorial taxation system rather 
than a world-wide system with credits for foreign taxes paid;119 it 
created a new deduction for certain businesses taxed on a pass-through 
basis;120 it allowed a 100% immediate deduction for many new business 
investments;121 it doubled the standard deduction amounts for 
individual taxpayers;122 it lowered individual income tax rates across 
the board;123 it lowered the cap on the home mortgage interest 
deduction;124 it instituted a new cap on the deduction for state and local 
taxes;125 it doubled the child tax credit;126 it eliminated the personal 
 
=115&session=1&vote=00323. In the House, of those Representatives voting, all 
Democrats voted against the bill along with 12 Republicans, while 224 Republicans 
voted in favor of the bill. FINAL VOTE RESULTS FOR ROLL CALL 699 (Dec. 20, 2017), 
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2017/roll699.xml. The twelve Republican representatives 
who voted against the bill were almost all from California, New York, or New Jersey, 
states with high state and local taxes, which would be hit hardest by the new cap on 
deducting state and local taxes (one of the dissenting Republicans was from North 
Carolina).  Sam Petulla, Sean O’Key, and Hannah Lang, The	House	Republicans	Who	Voted	
‘No’	 on	 Tax	 Reform, CNN (Nov. 16, 2017), 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/16/politics/house-republicans-vote-no-tax- 
bill/index.html. 
	 117	 See	NAT. ASS’N OF TAX PROFESSIONALS, Tax	Cuts	 and	 Jobs	Act	 of	 2017,	HR	 1, (nd), 
https://www.natptax.com/explore/Documents/Tax%20Cuts%20and%20Jobs%20Act
%202017 
%20Summary.pdf.; see	also	Adam Michel, Analysis	of	the	2017	Tax	Cuts	and	Jobs	Act, THE 
HERITAGE FOUNDATION. (Dec. 19, 2017), 
https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017- 12/IB4800_0.pdf. 
 118 2017 Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11061, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017); for 2020 
exemption amount, see Rev. Proc. 2019-44. 
 119 2017 Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13541(D), 131 Stat. 2054 (2017); for a partial 
critique of the international tax changes; see David Kamin, David Gamage, Ari Glogower, 
Rebecca Kysar, Darien Shanske, Reuven Avi-Yonah, Lily Batchelder, J. Clifton Fleming, 
Daniel Hemel, Mitchell Kane, David Miller, Daniel Shaviro, & Manoj Viswanathan, The	
Games	 They	 Will	 Play:	 Tax	 Games,	 Roadblocks,	 and	 Glitches	 Under	 the	 2017	 Tax	
Legislation, 103 MINN. L REV. 1439, 41-42 (2019). 
 120 2017 Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11011, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). 
 121 2017 Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13201, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). 
 122 2017 Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11021, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). 
 123 2017 Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11001, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). 
 124 2017 Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11043, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). 
 125 2017 Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11042, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). 
 126 2017 Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11022, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). 
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exemption amount;127 and it made multiple other changes not listed 
here.128  Most of these changes expire or “sunset” in 2025 (a common 
feature of tax bills due to the Senate budget reconciliation rules 
discussed below), while others are permanent.129 
Significantly for this Article, the 2017 Tax Act reduced the shared 
responsibility tax to zero.130  While it is commonly misreported that the 
2017 Tax Act eliminated the individual mandate, it did not do so; it 
lowered the tax that enforces the individual mandate to zero.  In other 
words, after the 2017 Tax Act, an individual who fails to maintain 
adequate health coverage, as required by the individual mandate of the 
ACA, faces no penalty; there is no enforcement mechanism for the 
individual mandate after the 2017 Tax Act changes.131  At the same time, 
the 2017 Tax Act left in place other taxes that were introduced by the 
ACA, such as the 0.9% additional Medicare tax and the 3.8% tax on net 
investment income, both of which are imposed on higher-income 
individuals—a strong indicator that the 2017 Congress thought the rest 
of the ACA could stand on its own even without an individual mandate 
penalty tax.132 
At first glance, it seems odd to reduce the enforcement tax to zero 
while leaving in place the mandate itself, until one considers the 
procedural posture of the 2017 Tax Act.  The 2017 Tax Act was 
introduced in the House on November 2, 2017 as H.R. 1 pursuant to 
budget reconciliation instructions and was passed using budget 
reconciliation authority.133  As explained more fully below, budget 
reconciliation is a process that allows Congress to pass budget-related 
legislation without the threat of a filibuster in the Senate.  This process 
allows such legislation to pass with a simple majority in the Senate, 
whereas regular legislation is always subject to a threat of a filibuster.  
 
 127 2017 Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11041, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). 
	 128	 See	generally	NAT’L ASS’N OF TAX PROF, supra	note 117; see	also	Michel, supra	note 
117. 
	 129	 See	generally	NAT’L ASS’N OF TAX PROF, supra note 117; see Michel, supra note 117; 
see also Rebecca M. Kysar, The	Sun	Also	Rises:	The	Political	Economy	Of	Sunset	Provisions	
In	The	Tax	Code, 40 GA. L. REV. 335 (2006); Manoj Viswanathan, Sunset	Provisions	In	The	
Tax	Code:	A	Critical	Evaluation	And	Prescriptions	For	The	Future,	82 N.Y.U.L. REV. 656 
(2007) (giving background on the proliferation of sunsetting provisions in tax bills). 
 130 2017 Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11081, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). 
	 131	 See Id.  
	 132	 See 26 U.S.C. § 3101(b)(2) (additional Medicare tax); 26 U.S.C. § 1411 (net 
investment tax). 
 133 Bill History in the Congressional Record, Congress.gov, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1/history; for general 
information on budget reconciliation and tax legislation, see Rebecca Kysar, Tax	Law	and	
the	Eroding	Budget	Process, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 61 (2018). 
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Indeed H.R. 1 (which became the 2017 Tax Act) passed the Senate on 
the slimmest of margins, 51-48 with one Senator not voting.134  If the 
2017 Tax Act were not a budget reconciliation measure, it would 
certainly have failed due to a filibuster and a failed attempt at cloture. 
B. Budget	Reconciliation:	Purpose	and	Practice	
The Senate has long had a rule of procedure that allows Senators to 
indefinitely extend debate on pending matters—to filibuster.135  The 
Senate rules have no limitations on the length of time a debate can last, 
which allows any Senator or group of Senators to extend debate until 
the chamber recesses.136  Filibuster can effectively prevent any question 
pending in the Senate from proceeding to a final vote.  Although the 
filibuster has been part of Senate procedure since the beginning, the 
Senate also has, since 1917, had a rule that allows a supermajority of 
Senators (currently 60%) to end a filibuster and proceed to a final vote 
on a pending matter following an additional period of debate (currently 
30 hours); this is referred to as cloture.137  Commonly proffered reasons 
for the filibuster and cloture rules are that they encourage full 
deliberation, protect the minority voice in the Senate, and also promote 
consensus.138  
By the 1970s, Congress became concerned that the filibuster (and 
the difficult-to-pass cloture motion) was making passing a budget 
difficult.  Thus, in 1974, Congress passed the Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 that allows certain budget-related 
 
 134 See supra	note 116. 
	 135	 See S. Res. 285, 113th Cong. § 1 (2013); see	also VALERIE HEITSHUSEN & RICHARD S. 
BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30360, FILIBUSTERS AND CLOTURE IN THE SENATE 4 (2017);	see	
also Filibuster	and	Cloture, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/ artandhistory/history/ 
common/briefing/Filibuster_Cloture.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2020). 
	 136	 See S. Res. 285, 113th Cong. § 1 (2013); see	also VALERIE HEITSHUSEN & RICHARD S. 
BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30360, FILIBUSTERS AND CLOTURE IN THE SENATE 4 (2017);	see	
also Filibuster	and	Cloture, U.S. SENATE, 
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Filibuster_Cloture.
htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2020). 
 137 CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-425, INVOKING CLOTURE IN THE SENATE 
1-2 (2017).  The cloture rule was added in 1917, so while it has a long history, the 
filibuster existed for a long time without the limitation of the cloture rules;	see	also	
Cloture	Rule, U.S. Senate, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/ 
history/minute/Cloture_Rule.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2020) (describing the history 
surrounding the adoption of the cloture rule during President Woodrow Wilson’s 
term). 
 138 VALERIE HEITSHUSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 96-548, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS ON THE 
SENATE FLOOR: AN INTRODUCTION 1 (2019). 
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legislation to pass without threat of filibuster in the Senate.139 A budget 
reconciliation bill that qualifies under this procedure will pass on a 
simple majority in both chambers, rather than needing the support of 
more than sixty Senators (60%) to defeat a potential filibuster.140 
Under budget reconciliation, the House and Senate pass a 
concurrent budget resolution that gives reconciliation instructions to 
committees in each chamber; the budget resolution adopts budget goals 
for at least the next five fiscal years and instructs committees in each 
chamber to “reconcile” current law with the budgetary goals adopted.141  
The committees then create legislation that implements the 
instructions, and each chamber votes on the legislation produced by 
their committees.  If the legislation passed by the House and Senate are 
not identical, a conference committee is convened to work out the 
differences.142  The concurrent budget resolutions are not binding and 
are not subject to veto by the President.143 
For example, for fiscal year 2018 (the year the 2017 Tax Act was 
passed) the House passed House Concurrent Resolution number 71 as a 
budget resolution.144  The Senate also introduced its own budget 
resolution,145 but ultimately the Senate amended the House concurrent 
resolution and the House accepted the Senate’s amendment.146  The 
budget resolution recommended levels for revenue and outlays for the 
next ten years (a common practice for budget resolutions) (Section 
 
 139 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 
88 Stat. 297 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.). 
	 140	 Id. at §§ 305(b), (c) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 1326) (limiting the time for debate in 
the Senate). 
 141 MEGAN S. LYNCH & JAMES V. SATURNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44058, THE BUDGET 
RECONCILIATION PROCESS: STAGES OF CONSIDERATION 1 (2017); see	 also	 Policy	 Basics:	
Introduction	 to	 the	 Federal	 Budget	 Process, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES,	
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/3-7-03bud.pdf (last updated 
Apr. 2, 2020). 
 142 MEGAN S. LYNCH & JAMES V. SATURNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44058, THE BUDGET 
RECONCILIATION PROCESS: STAGES OF CONSIDERATION 9 (2017); see	 also	 Policy	 Basics:	
Introduction	 to	 the	 Federal	 Budget	 Process, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES,	
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/3-7-03bud.pdf (last updated 
Apr. 2, 2020). 
 143 David Reich & Richard Kogan, Introduction	to	Budget	“Reconciliation,”	CTR. 
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Nov. 9, 2016), 
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/1-22-15bud.pdf. 
 144 H.R. Con. Res. 71, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 145 S. Con. Res. 25, 115th Cong. (2017), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th- 
congress/senate-concurrent-resolution/25.  
 146 H.R. Con. Res. 71, 115th Cong. (2017), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th- 
congress/house-concurrent-resolution/71/all 
actions?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22h.con.res.+71%22%5D%7D&s=1&r=5 
(all actions on bill). 
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1101), recommended a budget level for specific governmental functions 
(Section 1102), and limited the overall increase in the deficit (sections 
2001 and 2002).147 
A full understanding of the budget reconciliation process is 
impossible without considering the impact of the Byrd rule, named after 
its proponent, former West Virginia Senator Robert Byrd.  The Byrd rule 
was unanimously adopted by the Senate as a temporary measure and 
was later codified.148  Senator Byrd, and Congress, had concerns that the 
budget reconciliation process would be used to pass non-budget related 
measures on a simple majority vote, circumventing the filibuster and 
cloture procedures that protect the deliberative process in the Senate.  
Therefore, under the Byrd rule (in its current form), “extraneous” 
provisions cannot be considered by the Senate at any point during the 
budget reconciliation process.  A provision is extraneous if it: (A) does 
not produce a change in outlays or revenues; (B) produces an increase 
in outlays or decrease in revenues that does not follow the reconciliation 
instructions in the budget resolution; (C) is not in the jurisdiction of the 
committee that reported the provision; (D) produces changes in outlays 
or revenues that are merely incidental to the nonbudgetary components 
of the provision; (E) increases the deficit in any fiscal year after the 
period specified in the budget resolution (i.e., the “budget window”); 
or (F) recommends changes to Social Security.149 
The Byrd rule is not self-executing; a court cannot strike a 
provision as violative of the Byrd rule.150  To enforce the Byrd rule, a 
Senator must raise a point of order challenging a provision as 
extraneous under the Byrd rule.151  The presiding officer of the Senate 
then must rule on the point of order.152  If the presiding officer sustains 
the point of order, finding the provision extraneous, the provision is 
stricken from the legislation.153  If the presiding officer rejects the point 
of order, finding the provision to not be extraneous, the provision 
remains in the legislation.154  Sixty Senators (60%), however, can vote 
to waive the Byrd rule violation, or overrule the presiding officer.155  
 
	 147	 Id. 
 148 2 U.S.C. § 644 (2018); BILL HENNIFF JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30862, THE BUDGET 
RECONCILIATION PROCESS: THE SENATE’S “BYRD RULE” 1 (2016). 
	 149	 See 2 U.S.C. § 644(b)(1). 
 150 Ellen P. Aprill and Daniel J. Hemel, The	Tax	Legislative	Process:	A	Byrd’s	Eye	View, 
81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 99, 105 (2018). 
	 151	 Id. 
	 152	 Id. 
	 153	 Id. 
	 154	 Id. 
	 155	 Id. 
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This is the same supermajority needed to invoke cloture to overcome a 
filibuster in a non-budget reconciliation process.  In practice, the 
presiding officer typically consults with either the Senate Budget 
Committee Chair or the Senate Parliamentarian before ruling on a Byrd 
rule point of order, depending on the argument for why the provision is 
extraneous.156  Furthermore, in practice, sponsors of the legislation 
frequently consult with the Senate Parliamentarian before legislation 
goes to a final vote, and often before points of order are raised;  
members of both parties will raise arguments regarding Byrd rule 
compliance with the Parliamentarian off the record.  This non-public 
process is referred to as a “byrd bath.”157 
Clearly, the Senate could not have used the budget reconciliation 
process to completely repeal the ACA without a supermajority of 
Senators in favor.  Recall that the Byrd rule prohibits any provision that 
“produces changes in outlays or revenues which are merely incidental 
to the non-budgetary components of the provision.”158  Generally 
speaking, the application of this provision often is not entirely clear 
because it is a standard rather than a bright line rule.  The presiding 
officer, relying on the parliamentarian, must exercise judgement in 
determining whether a particular provision’s budget impact is “merely 
incidental” to its non-budget impact.159  The fact that so much of this 
decision-making occurs off the record by the parliamentarian makes it 
even less certain which provisions are likely to violate the Byrd rule and 
which are not.160  Nevertheless, it remains clear that a repeal of the ACA 
would violate this provision of the Byrd rule.  While ACA repeal would 
certainly change the federal budget, the budgetary impact of repealing 
the ACA is clearly secondary to the profound policy changes of an ACA 
repeal.  
 
 156 Aprill & Hemel, supra note 150 at 107. 
	 157	 Id.	at 107. 
 158 2 U.S.C. § 644(b)(1)(A). 
 159 Aprill & Hemel, supra note 150 at 107. 
 160 In 1993, the Senate Budget Committee stated “This subparagraph contributes 
much of the ambiguity created by [the Byrd rule].  Its language calls for the exercise of 
judgment.  The Parliamentarian has not laid down any bright-line test to aid that 
judgment, and reserves the right to consider each individual case on its merits.  The 
drafters of this subparagraph wished to prohibit provisions in which policy changes 
plainly overwhelmed deficit changes.  For example, a nationwide abortion prohibition 
might marginally reduce Government spending, but would constitute a much more 
significant policy change than budgetary action.  The application of this subparagraph, 
however, has ranged wider than such plain cases.”  WILLIAM G. DAUSTER, BUDGET PROCESS 
LAW ANNOTATED 208 n.580 (1993).  
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IV. CALIFORNIA V. TEXAS AND SEVERABILITY DOCTRINE 
A. Background	of	the	California	v.	Texas	Case	
In California	 v.	 Texas, states and individuals are once again 
challenging the constitutionality of the ACA.  The provision under direct 
attack in California	 v.	Texas	 is the individual mandate.  As explained 
above, the individual mandate requires most individuals to maintain 
health coverage.  In 2012, in National	 Federation	 of	 Independent	
Businesses	 v.	 Sebelius	 (“NFIB”),161 the United States Supreme Court 
upheld the individual mandate as a constitutional exercise of Congress’ 
taxing power because the consequence of not maintaining health 
coverage was the imposition of a penalty tax.162  Subsequent to that 
ruling by the United States Supreme Court, however, Congress passed 
the 2017 Tax Act which reduced the tax (called the shared responsibility 
payment) that enforces the individual mandate to zero.163  The 
challengers in California	v.	Texas	argue that because Congress reduced 
the tax to zero, the individual mandate can no longer be considered a 
constitutionally permissible exercise of taxing authority.164  The District 
Court judge agreed with this argument, holding that the individual 
mandate is no longer constitutional.165  The District Court referred to 
the Supreme Court’s decision in NFIB,	which	found that the individual 
mandate standing alone would be an unconstitutional overreach, 
exceeding Congressional authority, but that the inclusion of a penalty 
tax to enforce the individual mandate made the mandate constitutional 
under the taxing authority.166  The District Court further found that a tax 
set at zero is the same as no tax at all.167  Thus, without a tax, the 
individual mandate cannot be upheld under the taxing authority.  
The states and individual parties seeking to uphold the ACA 
appealed the decision to the Fifth Circuit, which issued a decision on 
December 18, 2019.168  The Fifth Circuit agreed with the District Court 
that the individual mandate can no longer be considered a constitutional 
exercise of Congressional authority—without a tax, the individual 
mandate cannot be considered an exercise of Congress’ tax and 
 
	 161	 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
	 162	 Id.	at 2580. 
 163 2017 Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97 § 11081, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). 
	 164	 Texas	D.Ct., 340 F.Supp. 3d 579, 585 (N.Dist. Tex. 2018). 
	 165	 Id. 
	 166	 Id. 
	 167	 Id. at 601. 
 168 See generally Texas	5th	Cir.,	945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019). 
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spending power.169  Because this Article focuses on the severability 
question, this Article proceeds on the assumption that these holdings 
will be upheld by the United States Supreme Court, although this is far 
from certain.170 
Having found the individual mandate unconstitutional, the District 
Court judge next examined whether the now-unconstitutional 
individual mandate could be severed from the rest ACA and determined 
that it could not.171  Therefore, the District Court’s ruling strikes down 
the entire ACA as unconstitutional because it is not severable from the 
individual mandate.172  On appeal, the Fifth Circuit remanded the 
severability question to the District Court, instructing it to provide 
additional analysis.173  Before the District Court could revisit the case, 
the Supreme Court granted cert.174 
In determining that the individual mandate is not severable from 
the entirety of the ACA, the District Court judge focused on 
Congressional intent—whether Congress would have wanted the rest of 
the ACA to stand knowing that that the individual mandate was 
unconstitutional.175  This court’s analysis did not adequately take into 
consideration a very important element of Congressional intent, 
however: the particular procedure that Congress used to pass the 2017 
Tax Act.  The individual mandate was ruled unconstitutional only 
because Congress lowered the tax to zero.176  Congress lowered the tax 
to zero through the budget reconciliation process, which allows budget-
related legislation to pass the Senate without threat of a filibuster.177  
Congress could not have directly repealed the ACA through the budget 
 
 169 See generally id.	
 170 The case raises a variety of issues that are outside the scope of this Article.  For 
example, it is possible that individual mandate continues to be constitutional, even 
without a tax to enforce the mandate, because without an enforcement mechanism it 
does not alter anyone’s legal rights.  This would make the severability question moot.  
Another issue in the case is whether the plaintiffs have standing to challenge the ACA.  
Arguably plaintiffs have no damages from the individual mandate because it is 
effectively non-enforceable without the penalty tax.  Another issue is whether the 
shared responsibility payment continues to be a tax even though it is now set to zero.  
Congress did not repeal the tax or eliminate it from the tax code, but rather set the tax 
rate at zero. 
	 171	 Texas	D.Ct.,	340 F.Supp. 3d 579	at 585-86. 
	 172	 Id. 
	 173	 Texas	5th	Cir., 945 F.3d at 369. 
 174 Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579 (N.D. Tex. 2018), aff’d	in	part,	vacated	
in	part,	remanded, 945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019), cert.	granted	sub	nom. California	v.	Texas, 
140 S. Ct. 1262 (2020) (No. 19-840). 
 175 See Texas	D.Ct., 340 F. Supp. 3d at 606-607. 
	 176	 Id.	at 605. 
 177 See generally 2017 Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).   
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reconciliation process, and judges should not allow Congress to 
indirectly repeal the ACA through this process.178  Judges should 
consider the procedural posture of the legislation in determining 
Congressional intent with respect to severability.  While the District 
Court acknowledged that the 2017 Tax Act was passed using budget 
reconciliation authority, and that Congress could not have used this 
process to repeal the rest of the ACA, the court did not discuss this 
aspect of the legislation in its analysis.179 
The Fifth Circuit instructed the District Court to more carefully 
consider the intent of the Congress that passed the 2017 Tax Act, and to 
use a “finer-toothed comb” regarding which specific provisions of the 
ACA are constitutionally inseverable.180  Because the 2017 Tax Act was 
passed through the budget reconciliation process, and because the same 
process could not have been used by Congress to repeal most other 
parts of the ACA, it could not have been the intent of Congress to repeal 
the entirety of the ACA.  Or if that was their intent, it was an intent that 
violated Congress’ own rules of procedure.  It also seems clear that 
Congress must have intended the rest of the ACA to continue to function 
without the individual mandate, because that is precisely what Congress 
did in the 2017 Tax Act. 
This Article does not argue that provisions of laws can never be 
struck down as being inseverable from provisions amended under 
budget reconciliation in a manner that makes them unconstitutional.  
This practice, however, should be rare.  It should be incumbent on 
Congress to use a procedure that fully implements its intent, rather than 
relying on a court to do so.  In other words, if the 2017 Congress 
intended to eliminate the individual mandate by lowering the penalty 
tax, and if the 2017 Congress intended that the individual mandate be 
inseverable from the rest of the ACA, then the 2017 Congress should 
have employed a Congressional procedure that would allow it to repeal 
the ACA itself rather than asking the court to do so.  Judges should 
consider the procedural posture of such legislation when making 
severability determinations.  Simply put, there should be a very strong 
presumption that Congress did not intend to alter legislation indirectly 
that it could not have altered directly because of the legislative process 
used.  The hurdle of severability should be high or judges risk engaging 
in legislating from the bench.  The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that 
“[s]everability doctrine places courts between a rock and hard place.”181  
 
 178 See Part III, supra. 
	 179	 Texas	D.Ct.,	340 F. Supp. 3d	at 591. 
	 180	 Texas	5th	Cir., 945 F.3d at 402.	
	 181	 Id.	at 394. 
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Severability doctrine rests in large part on a respect for the separation 
of powers.182  Because of this, courts should be especially wary of 
Congress weaponizing the courts to accomplish indirectly what the 
Congress could not accomplish directly.  Justice Roberts, during oral 
arguments, appeared to be animated by this concern when he asked the 
Solicitor General for California, “I think it’s hard for you to argue that 
Congress intended the entire Act to fall if the mandate were struck down 
when the same Congress that lowered the penalty to zero did not even 
try to repeal the rest of the Act.  I think, frankly, that they wanted the 
Court to do that.  But that’s not our job.”183 
B. The	2010	Congressional	Findings	Are	Not	Dispositive	
At the Supreme Court, the respondents are a group of states led by 
Texas, the federal government, and individuals Neill Hurley and John 
Nantz.184  Collectively, they argue that the 2017 Tax Act made the 
individual mandate unconstitutional, that the individual mandate is not 
severable from the remainder of the ACA, and that, therefore, the entire 
ACA is unconstitutional. 
In their briefs before the Supreme Court, the respondents Texas 
and the Federal Government each rely heavily on the 2010 ACA 
Congressional findings; the Congressional findings refer to the 
individual mandate as “essential to creating effective health insurance 
markets in which improved health insurance products that are 
guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of pre-existing conditions 
can be sold.”185  Texas argues that this statement acts as an 
“inseverability” clause, that the 2017 Congress effectively readopted 
these findings by amending the ACA without amending the findings, and 
that the Supreme Court should defer to this statement of Congressional 
intent and refuse to sever the now-unconstitutional individual mandate 
from the rest of the ACA.186 
While the 2010 Congress clearly viewed the individual mandate as 
an important part of the ACA, Texas tries to convert this into a finding 
 
 182 Kenneth A. Klukowski, Severability	Doctrine:	How	Much	of	a	Statute	Should	Federal	
Courts	Invalidate?, 16 TEX. REV. LAW & POL. 1, 39-52 (2011). 
 183 Transcript of Oral Argument at 62-63, California v. Texas (2020) No. 19-840. 
 184 Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579 (N.D. Tex. 2018), aff’d	in	part,	vacated	
in	part,	remanded, 945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019), cert.	granted	sub	nom. California	v.	Texas, 
140 S. Ct. 1262 (2020) (No. 19-840). 
 185 Brief for the Federal Respondents at 37, California v. Texas, No. 19-840 (filed June 
25, 2020; Brief for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner States at 37, California v. Texas, No. 19-
840 (filed June 25, 2020); see	also	42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I) (2018). 
 186 Brief for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner States at 37, California v. Texas, No. 19-840 
(filed June 25, 2020). 
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that the individual mandate is indispensable.187  In short, Texas is trying 
to make the 2010 finding do too much work.  It seems clear that the 2010 
statement of Congressional findings was an attempt by that Congress to 
articulate a basis for the ACA under the Commerce Clause of the United 
States Constitution.  In fact, all of the findings are described as “effects” 
that demonstrate the mandate “is commercial and economic in nature, 
and substantially affects interstate commerce.”188  A set of findings 
aimed at bolstering an argument that the legislation is constitutional is 
entirely distinct from a true inseverability clause.189  If the question is 
whether the 2010 Congress would have passed all or large portions of 
the ACA without the individual mandate, the 2010 findings do not 
provide an answer.   
If the question is whether the 2017 Congress functionally 
readopted the findings when it passed the 2017 Tax Act, that answer is 
also elusive.  The 2017 Congress had the benefit of the NFIB	decision, 
where the Supreme Court explained that the ACA is not a constitutional 
exercise of the Commerce Clause power.190  From a political standpoint, 
it would not make sense for a legislature to spend time and political 
capital tinkering with findings that functionally were a nullity.  The 2017 
Congress also had the benefit of hindsight and would have understood 
that the individual mandate was never as effective at incentivizing 
enrollment in insurance as the 2010 Congress apparently assumed it 
would be.  As explained above, and as noted in an amicus brief filed by a 
bipartisan group of economic scholars, the insurance markets 
remained stable even in years when there was no tax penalty, 
supported primarily by the Premium Tax Credit subsidies and expanded 
Medicaid.191  Finally, the 2017 Congress could not have amended the 
findings under the budget reconciliation process it chose to use—such a 
change in the findings would be violative of the Byrd rule as an 
extraneous provision. 
 
	 187	 Id.	at 29-31. 
 188 42 U.S.C. § 18091(1) (2018). 
 189 The Supreme Court had an opportunity to rule on a true severability clause in 
2020.  The Court cited 4 U.S.C. § 125 to justify its decision that certain provisions of the 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 were inseverable from a provision ruled 
unconstitutional.  Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants, Inc, 140 S. Ct. 
2335, 2349 (2020).  4 U.S.C. § 125 provides: “If a court of competent jurisdiction enters 
a final judgment on the merits that— 1. Is based on federal law; 2. Is no longer subject 
to appeal; and 3. Substantially limits or impairs the essential elements of sections 116 
through 126 of this title, then sections 116 through 126 of this title are invalid and have 
no legal effect as of the date of entry of such judgment.  
	 190	 See	generally NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).	
 191 Br. Amici Curiae for Bipartisan Economic Scholars in Support of Pet’rs at 5, 
California v. Texas, No. 19-840 (filed May 13, 2020). 
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C. The	ACA	Case	Is	Not	a	Frost‐Style	Convergent	Constitutional	
Violation	
While neither the District Court nor the Fifth Circuit explored this 
remedy, scholars have argued that a court could sever off or invalidate 
the provision in the 2017 Tax Act that lowered the shared responsibility 
payment to zero.192  Under this argument, California	v.	Texas	does not 
present a simple severability question—where a single statute passed 
by a single Congress contains both constitutional and unconstitutional 
provisions—but rather presents what is known as a “convergent 
constitutional violation.”193  A convergent constitutional violation 
occurs when there are two statutory provisions, both of which would be 
constitutional on their own, but are unconstitutional when read 
together.  In Frost	v.	Corporation	Commission	of	Oklahoma,194 the United 
States Supreme Court struck down an amendment that rendered an 
unamended portion of an existing statute unconstitutional.195  There,	an 
Oklahoma statute required a permit based on public necessity in order 
to operate a cotton gin.196  The plaintiff/appellant obtained a cotton gin 
permit upon a showing of public necessity.197  The statute was later 
amended by the legislature to add an exception that allowed cotton gins 
organized as cooperatives to obtain permits without a showing of public 
necessity.198  The Supreme Court found that this scheme of requiring a 
public necessity showing for some applicants but not for others violated 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.199  The remedy that the 
Court fashioned was to enjoin the amendment, leaving the original 
statute in force, unamended.200 
None of the parties discuss this issue in their briefs, although the 
Cato Institute filed an amicus brief that relies heavily on the Frost	
precedent, arguing that the 2017 Congressional intent should be 
ignored, leaving in place the original intent of the 2010 Congress which 
called the individual mandate “essential” in its findings and which the 
Cato Institute argues is dispositive of 2010 Congressional intent with 
 
 192 James Durling & E. Garrett West, Severing	Unconstitutional	Amendments,	86 U.CHI. 
L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2018); Josh Blackman, Undone:	 The	 New	 Constitutional	 Challenge	 to	
ObamaCare, 23 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1 (2018). 
	 193	 See	generally Durling & West,	supra	note 192,	at 7-8. 
 194 Frost v. Corp. Com. Of Okla., 278 U.S. 515 (1929). 
	 195	 Id.	at 528. 
	 196	 Id.	at 517. 
	 197	 Id.	at 517. 
	 198	 Id.	at 517. 
	 199	 Id.	at 528. 
	 200	 Frost, 278 U.S. at 528. 
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respect to severability.201  Other scholars have argued that Frost paves 
the way for the Supreme Court to enjoin the 2017 Tax Act’s lowering of 
the tax penalty to zero.202 
Frost	presents a close, but distinct, situation from the ACA facts, 
however.  In Frost,	the second legislative action did not directly amend 
the first legislative action, but instead created a new permitting scheme 
for certain entities.  Either scheme (requiring a showing of public 
necessity or not) would be perfectly constitutional on its own, but read 
together it created a scheme where some entities were required to show 
public necessity but others were not, which violated equal protection.  
In the ACA case, the second legislative action did directly amend the first 
legislative action, after taking into account the NFIB holding.  The 2017 
Congress changed the tax rate of the penalty adopted by the 2010 
Congress, which is not a constitutional problem on its own.  The 
Supreme Court created a saving construction in the NFIB	case, however, 
and the tax provision is inextricably linked to the mandate because of 
that savings construction.203  Thus, the 2017 Tax Act effectively 
amended not only the tax provision but also the mandate.204  Whereas 
Frost	is provision A (first-in-time) plus	provision B (later-in-time), the 
ACA case is provision AB (first-in-time) minus	 provision A (later-in-
time).  Frost’s A and B were each constitutional standing on their own, 
which contrasts with the ACA case where the individual mandate is 
likely not constitutional standing on its own (as decided by the Court in 
NFIB).  Thus, Frost	 is not perfectly applicable, although could be 
instructive if the Court decides the individual mandate is constitutional 
without the penalty tax. 
D. If	the	Individual	Mandate	Is	Unconstitutional,	It	Is	
Severable	from	the	Rest	of	the	ACA	
Assuming for the sake of argument that the District Court and the 
Fifth Circuit are correct in finding the individual mandate to be 
unconstitutional following the passage of the 2017 Tax Act, how should 
the Court assess whether the individual mandate is severable from the 
rest of the ACA? 
 
 201 Br. For The Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Resp’ts at 3, California v. 
Texas, No. 19-840 (filed July 2, 2020); see	also	42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I).  Note that one of 
the primary authors of The Cato Institute’s brief is Professor Josh Blackman, author of 
the one of the law review articles discussing the applicability of Frost	to this case. 
	 202	 See	generally Durling & West,	supra	note 192,	at 9-10. 
	 203	 See	generally NFIB,	132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 204 Arguably, eliminating the penalty tax violated the Byrd rule because of its impact 
on the individual mandate, but a point of order was not raised at the time and a court 
cannot enforce the Byrd rule after the fact. 
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When a portion of a statute is deemed to be unconstitutional, the 
Court must determine whether to allow the remaining parts of the 
statute to continue in force without the objectionable portion.  Whether 
portions of a statute can be separated, or severed, from the 
objectionable portions of the statute is essentially a test of legislative 
intent—if Congress had known that a portion of the statute would be 
found to be unconstitutional, would it have passed the remainder of the 
statute anyway?205  The test is not whether Congress would	prefer to 
include the invalidated provision or not, but whether Congress would	
pass the rest of the legislation without the problematic provision.206  In 
keeping with the focus on legislative intent, courts strive to save as much 
of the legislation as possible.  David Gans has described this principle as 
“the core command of severability doctrine, a firmly established tenet of 
judicial restraint.”207 
Both the Fifth Circuit and the District Court cite the leading United 
States Supreme Court decision in stating the test for severability: 
“Unless it is evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those 
provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is 
not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a 
law.”208  The District Court explains that the court first looks to see if 
Congress’ intent is evident through statutory interpretation, and if it is, 
the court follows that intent.209  If the intent is not evident, then the court 
will ask if the rest of the statute is capable of functioning independently; 
if it is not, it is presumed that Congress could not have intended them to 
 
 205 Kenneth A. Klukowski, Severability	Doctrine:	How	Much	of	a	Statute	Should	Federal	
Courts	Invalidate?, 16 TEX. REV. LAW & POL. 1 (2011).  Professor Klukowski explains that 
the modern severability test is actually a two-part test.  First, the court should ask if the 
rest of the statute would be fully functional without the excised provision, and if so, then 
the statute should be severed, unless it is evident that Congress would not have wanted 
that result.  Id. at 54-56.  Professor Klukowski acknowledges that Congressional intent 
is relevant to both parts of his test and that the parts overlap, so it is not surprising that 
courts place such heavy emphasis on Congressional intent.  Id.	 at 57.  Further, the 
Supreme Court has noted that it is “fairly unusual” for a statute to fail the first part of the 
test.  Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants, Inc., 140 S.Ct. 2335, 2352 
(2020).	
	 206	 Id. 
 207 David H. Gans, American	 Constitution	 Society	 Issue	Brief	 –	 To	 Save	 and	Not	 to	
Destroy:	 Severability,	 Judicial	 Restraint,	 and	 the	 Affordable	 Care	 Act, CONSTITUTIONAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER at 1 (Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.theusconstitution.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/12/Issue-Brief-To-Save-and-Not-to-Destroy-Severability-
Judicial-Restraint-and-the-Affordable-Care-Act.pdf. 
	 208	 Texas	D.Ct., 340 F. Supp. 3d 579, 607 (N.D. Tex. 2018), (citing Alaska	Airlines	v.	
Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987)); Texas	5th	Cir.,	945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Alaska	
Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684). 
	 209	 Texas	D.Ct., 340 F. Supp. 3d at 607. 
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stand alone, and the entire statute will fall.210  The Fifth Circuit explains 
the process slightly differently.  It starts with asking if the constitutional 
parts of the statute are able to operate “in ‘a manner consistent with the 
intent of Congress[]’” and then moves onto the inquiry of whether 
Congress would have passed such a statute.211 
The District Court appears most concerned with not legislating 
from the bench by leaving in place a truncated law that Congress did not 
actually pass, explaining that “were a court to overplay deference to 
sever an inseverable statute, it would embrace the very evil the doctrine 
is designed to deter.”212  The Fifth Circuit, stating that “[s]everability 
doctrine places courts between a rock and hard place,”213 recognizes not 
only the danger that motivates the District Court but also the danger of 
a court “invalidating more of the statute than is necessary.’”214  The Fifth 
Circuit also acknowledges the duty to preserve as much as a statute as 
possible, noting that scholars have described this duty as a presumption 
of severability.215 
The parties to the case disagree as to which Congress’ intent should 
be considered: the intent of the Congress that passed the ACA in 2010 
or the intent of the Congress that passed the 2017 Tax Act.  The District 
Court did not consider this issue because it deemed it to be irrelevant, 
since the District Court found that it was the intent of both Congresses 
that the rest of the ACA is inseparable from the individual mandate.  
There are several problems with this analysis.  First, it seems clear that 
looking at the intent of the original 2010 Congress alone is insufficient.  
The challenge is not to the statute as passed by that Congress but rather 
to the statute as amended by the 2017 Congress.  Giving due deference 
to legislative power, a court could not tie the hands of a later Congress 
by looking exclusively at the intent of an earlier Congress.  Even if the 
2010 Congress that passed the ACA intended the individual mandate to 
be inseparable from the rest of the statute, the later-in-time Congress 
that amended the individual mandate (through amending the tax that 
enforced the mandate) could well have a different intent—an intent 
informed by seven years of experience with the statute.  Generally 
speaking, a later-in-time Congressional action is given priority over an 
 
	 210	 Id. 
	 211	 Texas	5th	Cir., 945 F.3d	at 394, (citing Alaska	Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685.) 
	 212	 Texas	D.Ct., 340 F. Supp. 3d at 606. 
	 213	 Texas	5th	Cir., 945 F.3d at 394. 
	 214	 Id. (citing Ayotte	 v.	 Planned	 Parenthood	 of	N.	New	England,	 546 U.S. 320, 328 
(2006)). 
	 215	 Id. at 395 (citing Adrian Vermeule, Saving	Constructions,	85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1950 
n.28 (1997)). 
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earlier-in-time Congressional action if they are inconsistent.216  Thus, 
while the intent of the original Congress is not irrelevant, it is the intent 
of the amending Congress that is paramount.  A court should not look 
solely at the intent of an earlier Congress to determine severability of an 
amended statutory provision when it is the amendment itself that 
causes the provision to be unconstitutional.  Despite this, the District 
Court spends most of its decision discussing the intent of the original 
2010 Congress, emphasizing the interlocking nature of the ACA’s 
provisions and dismissing the intent of 2017 Congress as essentially 
unknowable.217 
Second, the parties to the case all acknowledge that the Congress 
that passed the 2017 Tax Act could not have repealed the ACA directly 
because the 2017 Tax Act was passed pursuant to the budget 
reconciliation process.218  Despite describing determining the intent of 
the 2017 Congress as a “fool’s errand,” the District Court reasoned 
(without making an explicit finding) that the intent of the 2017 Congress 
must have been against severability because it did not repeal either the 
individual mandate or the statement of legislative intent that declares 
the individual mandate to be essential,  nor did the 2017 Congress 
otherwise repudiate severability.219  The court found this intent based 
on what the 2017 Congress “did not	do” (emphasis in original)—it did 
not directly repeal any part of the ACA.220  Indeed, the 2017 Congress 
could not have done so because the 2017 Congress was operating under 
budget reconciliation authority.  The court’s logic cuts both ways.  
Congress did not directly repeal any part of the ACA other than the 
penalty tax; therefore, it can be inferred that the 2017 Congress did not 
intend to dismantle the ACA and would want it to stand even absent an 
individual mandate.221 
 
 216 Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266, 101 S. Ct. 1673, 1678 (1981) (in dicta, the Court 
recognizes the general rule of construction that “the more recent of two irreconcilably 
conflicting statutes governs”); Food and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 143, 120 S. Ct. 1291, 1306 (2000) (“In determining whether 
Congress has spoken directly to the FDA’s authority to regulate tobacco, we must also 
consider in greater detail the tobacco-specific legislation that Congress has enacted over 
the past 35 years.  At the time a statute is enacted, it may have a range of plausible 
meanings.  Over time, however, subsequent acts can shape or focus those meanings.”).  
	 217	 See	generally	Texas	D.Ct., 340 F. Supp. 3d. 
	 218	 Id. at 591 (“Congress took no other action pertaining to the ACA. Nor could it. The 
reconciliation process limited Congress to doing exactly what it did: reducing taxes.”). 
	 219	 Id.	at 616. 
	 220	 Id.	at 617. 
 221 It seems apparent that the 2017 Congress understood that repealing the penalty 
tax (always couched as eliminating the individual mandate) could result in a higher rate 
of uninsured Americans and higher insurance premiums, but it also seems apparent that 
the 2017 Congress did not envision that the entire ACA would fall.  In fact, there was 
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Third, in considering whether the individual mandate is severable 
from the rest of the ACA, the court should take judicial notice of the facts 
that the 2017 Congress would have had about how the ACA has 
functioned.  It was assumed when the law was passed that the elements 
of the ACA were intertwined—that they were essential cogs in a 
machine.  As discussed above, however, it is notable that the ACA did not 
collapse when the Supreme Court made the Medicaid expansion 
voluntary, which prompted many states to decline its invitation to 
expand Medicaid.  It is also notable that many of those original non-
expansion states are now considering Medicaid expansion.  It is further 
notable that enrollment in marketplace plans has remained fairly robust 
despite the fact that the individual mandate has always been a weak 
requirement, and that the IRS has not been able to enforce the shared 
responsibility payments with the same vigor that it can enforce other 
taxes.  This is not the pattern one would expect to see with respect to an 
indispensable, non-severable legislative provision.  Indeed, it appears 
that the subsidies in the form of Premium Tax Credits and Cost Sharing 
Reductions do far more to urge people toward maintaining health 
insurance than the individual mandate ever could. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court is hearing yet another challenge to the 
Affordable Care Act.  This latest challenge raises unique and challenging 
issues about severability.  Severability doctrine has long been anchored 
in courts’ deference to the intent of the legislature, but this simple 
statement obscures difficult questions such as how courts should 
determine legislative intent and which intent matters when the 
legislative bodies have changed.  This Article applies severability 
doctrine to the challenge currently before the Supreme Court and 
argues that the procedural stance of the legislation that creates a 
Constitutional violation should matter to the severability analysis.  
Specifically, this Article argues that because the 2017 Tax Act that 
created the Constitutional problem was passed via a special 
Congressional procedure that could not have been used to revoke the 
entire ACA, this fact weighs heavily in favor of severability.  To do 
otherwise would allow Congress to circumvent its own procedures and 
 
serious consideration about passing a parallel measure that would stabilize the ACA 
insurance marketplaces, indicating an assumption that the ACA would continue without 
the individual mandate.  See	generally	Thomas Kaplan & Jim Tankersley, Senate	Plans	to	
End	 Obamacare	 Mandate	 in	 Revised	 Tax	 Proposal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/14/us/politics/tax-plan-senate-obamacare-
individual-mandate-trump.html. 
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ask the Court to do indirectly what Congress could not do directly.  Such 
a result would completely warp the separation of powers principles that 
undergird the severability doctrine. 
 
